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In idea selection, raters can attend and rely on 
information from multiple sources to determine which 
ideas are worthy for further consideration. Since that 
information can include feedback from external sources 
(e.g. number of likes from a community), it has the 
potential to act as anchor cues that impact decision 
making. Up to now, little is known about the 
susceptibility of raters to such information depends on 
individual’s motivational orientation (regulatory focus) 
as well as on the number of ideas presented 
simultaneously per subset. Using eye-tracking methods, 
findings show that anchoring-effect is less salient when 
raters were primed to prevention focus, although they 
searched more extensively for feedback information 
than their counterparts with promotion focus. 
Moreover, reducing the number of presented ideas per 
subset in prevention focus further decreased 
susceptibility to anchor cues. 
1. Introduction  
Innovation contests have become a popular way to 
find exceptional ideas and establish new ways to 
innovate and create value in companies [1, 2]. However, 
such idea competitions involve a variety of challenges 
[3] that require raters to be careful not to “kill the wrong 
ones” [4] as the uncertainty linked to such creativity 
contexts does not allow the application of typical 
problem solving models [5]. Following, there is no 
numerical decision rule or mathematical way to derive 
the best submissions, which might be the case in other 
contexts [6]. During idea selection, raters can attend and 
rely on information from different sources [7]. Although 
the essence of a submission is expressed through the 
ideator’s idea description, ideas often come with 
additional (feedback) information that might influence 
whether they get selected or not [8]. For example, a 
community can express their appreciation about an idea 
through the number of likes, which has been found to be 
a good predictor of implementation success [7]. 
Although classic theories in economics, philosophy, 
social science, psychology etc. assume humans to be 
rational [9], the provision of such feedback information 
has the potential to impact their decisions [10]. This 
kind of impact that is evoked by following the estimates 
of  previous decision makers is referred to as anchoring-
effect in literature [11]. In general, these influences on 
the tenets of logic and probability are also described as 
cognitive biases [9] and arise from the application of fast 
but fallible cognitive strategies known as heuristics [11]. 
Heuristics are originally grounded in the model of 
rational choice, which assumes that decisions emerge 
through the process of dynamic adaptations to external 
(environmental) and internal (human characteristics) 
factors [12]. Although the anchoring-effect is one of the 
most intensively examined behavioral biases [13], little 
is known about the role of motivation or personality 
traits on this phenomenon in the context of idea 
selection. For example, regulatory focus [14] as a basic 
driver of attitudes and behaviors is a motivational 
orientation that influences information processing 
behavior [15, 16, 17], which has also the ability to direct 
people's attention to information that fits their 
regulatory orientation  [18]. In this sense, receiving a 
recommendation regarding an option in a choice task 
might put the focus on that option and can bias 
information processing [19, 20]. Applied to the context 
of idea selection, the regulatory focus should thus also 
affect the susceptibility to available feedback 
information, which lacks empirical evidence so far.  
In terms of environmental factors, incorporating 
feedback information in decision making is a common 
behavior of individuals to handle complexity [21]. Due 
to cognitive limitations, individuals act in boundedly 
rational ways [12] that make them vulnerable to biases 
or heuristics during decision making [11]. Based on the 
knowledge from the research field of choice 
architecture, the efficient design of decision situations 
can help to overcome such irrational decision biases 
[22]. For example, IT design elements that allow the 
partitioning of the entire choice set into subsets that 





contain different number of options may have the 
potential to vary task complexity. Despite the fact that 
previous studies unveiled a relationship between the 
number of options and task complexity, which has also 
been identified as a driver of anchoring-effects [23], 
little is known about the impact of such a design element 
in the context of idea selection. Thus, identifying factors 
that influence individuals' susceptibility to anchor cues 
is essential to enhance understanding of underlying 
mechanisms [24]. By building on prior research [25], 
this research investigates information-search behavior 
under different regulatory foci as well as subset sizes 
and examines the effect of both factors on the tendency 
to follow feedback information. To the author’s best 
knowledge, past research hardly explored those effects 
in the context of idea selection tasks. Hence, the 
research question is: How do regulatory focus and idea 
partitioning affect rater’s attendance on and their 
tendency to follow feedback information?  
2. Background 
2.1. Idea feedback information and anchoring 
To deal with uncertain and complex situations, 
individuals apply cognitively traceable decision 
strategies, also known as heuristics, that reduce complex 
inference tasks to relatively simple cognitive operations 
[11]. While these “mental shortcuts” can help 
individuals to cope with such situations, they also have 
the potential to lead to systematically skewed results 
[26]. As one of the most studied cognitive biases, prior 
research [11] investigated the effect of anchor values on 
decision-making and demonstrated their influence on 
outcomes. The authors describe this mechanism as 
anchoring-effect, which can be defined as the 
disproportionate influence of initially presented values 
on the decision maker’s behavior. Although anchoring 
is well studied in several domains like general 
knowledge [27], probability estimation [28] or expert 
ratings [23], this phenomenon got little attention in the 
context of idea selection. When selecting ideas, raters 
typically have to decide what ideas are worthy for 
further consideration [29]. To do so, raters need to sift 
through different kind of information. Beside the idea 
description, describing the essence of an idea, raters can 
rely on a variety of additional information which can be 
classified into three sources [30]: Content-based 
information, which creates feedback related to the 
content of a submission (e.g. based on idea descriptions) 
may be enabled by recent developments in text-mining. 
For example, [31] developed a text-mining algorithm 
that allows to determine the novelty and familiarity of 
an idea based on the textual description represented in a 
single score. Another source for feedback can be related 
to the contributor of the idea itself. In this sense, 
research has found that an ideator’s prior success is an 
indicator of idea quality, since some individuals 
generate better ideas than others and tend to persist in 
producing ideas of  higher quality [2]. Finally, crowd-
based information such as the number of likes 
(commonly referred to as the “wisdom of crowd” [32]) 
expresses a community’s opinion or appreciation about 
ideas on the platform. Hence, all those information 
sources provide feedback in form of previous decisions 
and have the potential to impact subsequent decision 
making [10] if  raters incorporate the estimates into their 
own decision making [33]. Given the limited research 
about effects of providing feedback information in idea 
selection tasks, it remains unclear which factors impact 
susceptibility to them in this domain. 
2.2. Regulatory focus 
Since not all individuals may be equally receptive 
to anchor cues [24], the susceptibility to them depends 
on individual differences [34]. In this sense, related 
research [35] suggest that the extent of anchoring might 
be embedded in different thinking styles, which are 
driven by motivation. For example, from a 
psychological perspective, individual’s motivational 
orientation in decision making can be described by two 
self-regulatory systems [14]: With a promotion focus, 
individuals are sensitive to positive outcomes and strive 
for advancement and aspirations while preferring 
strategies to accomplish hits and avoid errors of 
omission. As an example, related literature [36] 
discovered that a promotion focus state encourages 
individuals to search for as many new strategies as 
possible to solve a creative problem, even if that does 
not imply solely finding the most appropriate ones.  
Moreover, research in comparative advertising 
highlights that promotion focused individuals express 
higher evaluations towards brands that were framed in a 
positive way [37]. That is in line with literature that 
argues promotion focused individuals are more likely to 
focus on positive signals of available options [38] that 
might result from the sensitivity to gain-related 
information [14]. Applied to the context of idea 
selection, such positive or gain related information 
might involve feedback information coming, for 
example, from a community. Following, a high number 
of likes could be an indicator for a gain related signal for 
individuals with a promotion focus. As the promotion 
focus of individuals encourages a more risk-taking 
behavior, research demonstrated that it can result in the 
adoption of heuristics in decision making [16]. Hence, 
promotion focused individuals tend to elaborate 
information on an abstract level that focuses more on 
commonalities and relationships [17]. In this sense, 
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literature found a more global processing of visual 
stimuli for individuals in promotion focus [15], which 
could be described by a shallower or more holistic 
processing of information. In contrast, individuals with 
a prevention focus are sensitive to negative outcomes 
that motivates them to apply vigilant decision strategies 
to ensure correct rejections and avoid false alarms [14, 
39]. Hence, the risk-aversion of prevention focused 
individuals facilitates the inclusion of substantive 
information in decision making [16]. As a result, 
prevention focused individuals evaluate situations more 
carefully, precisely, and in a detailed fashion to avoid 
undesirable end states [17, 40]. This is why prevention 
focused individuals show more concrete processing on 
an item-specific level of independent aspects [17]. 
Prevention focused individuals try to fulfill their duties 
and obligations to accomplish needs for safety and 
security [14]. In this sense, prevention focused primed 
individuals are less creative in problem solving [40] and 
endorse fewer alternative hypotheses than their 
counterparts in promotion focus [41]. Consequently, 
they should also be less prone to imitate feedback 
information. Although the regulatory focus was shown 
to influence information processing behavior in the 
context of consumer decisions [42] or in managerial 
decision making [43], its role for processing feedback 
information in the context of idea selection has been 
strongly neglected in literature so far. In this context, 
research has been conducted on its effect combined with 
self-affirmation and manipulations of mood on selection 
performance [44], but it still remains unclear to what 
extent raters pay attention to potentially anchor cues and 
how the motivational orientation affects susceptibility to 
them.  
2.3. Idea partitioning in subsets 
The process of dynamic adaptations induced by 
heuristics such as anchoring can be influenced not only 
by human characteristics, but also through 
environmental factors [12]. Depending on the 
characteristics of the choice environment, previous 
studies (e.g. [45, 46, 47, 48]) showed adaptations in the 
applied decision strategy that can be explained by the 
adaptive decision maker theory [49]. This theory 
supports the assumption that preferences are not 
necessarily derived by applying an invariant algorithm 
taken from a master list in memory, instead people use 
a variety of approaches that are highly sensitive to the 
local problem structure [50]. Applied to context of 
choice architectures, [51] states that the way choices are 
presented influences the choices made by decision 
makers. In this sense, related literature discussed the 
impact of partitioning choice sets by grouping options 
into categories of similar concepts [51]. For example, 
research demonstrated that design elements which 
present similar ideas in subsets, influenced perceived 
cognitive load during idea selection [52] that in turn was 
found to have an impact on the anchoring-effect through 
changes in the adjustments towards an anchor value [9]. 
However, prior research [51] ignored that choice sets 
may not only be partitioned to form categories, but also 
to generate subsets of different sizes without 
categorizing options according certain concepts. In this 
case, IT-tools allow to partition the whole choice set into 
subsets with a certain number of simultaneous presented 
options. Since research unrelated to idea selection have 
found adjustments in information-search behavior as a 
function of the number of alternatives in the choice set 
[53, 54], partitioning the choice set into subsets might 
induce similar effects. For example, literature [53, 55] 
stated that decision makers searched a smaller amount 
of information, when faced with higher task complexity 
resulting from an increase in the number of options. In 
particular, it is common for individuals to seek 
(feedback) information to include it in their decision 
making for reducing complexity [21]. For example, 
related research [23] demonstrated that anchoring-
effects of expert ratings on crowd evaluations are 
contingent on task complexity. Hence, depending on the 
complexity of a task, [54, 56, 57] showed that 
individuals use different information strategies. In this 
sense, individuals tend to use full processing strategies 
when task complexity is low, whereas tasks with higher 
complexity induce a reduced processing strategy to 
decrease cognitive effort. Applied to the context of idea 
selection, variations in the task complexity that might be 
induced by varying the number of options per subset 
should lead to similar effects on the susceptibility to 
feedback information. Nevertheless, little is known 
about those effects of different subset sizes in the 
described domain. Hence, as there is no neutral way to 
present choices [58], further investigations of such a 
design element that partitions the choice set into subsets 
are needed. 
3. Hypotheses development  
Depending on the regulatory focus, individuals 
differ in  their information processing behavior [15, 16, 
17]. In contrast to the prevention focus induced behavior 
to prevent making errors, individuals with a promotion 
focus accept errors instead of missing out opportunities 
[39]. Given that the regulatory focus influences the 
salience and perceived value of different types of 
information [43], it can direct individuals’ attention to 
information that fits their regulatory orientation [18]. As 
promotion focus encourages individuals to focus more 
on positive signals of available options [15], it enhances 
sensitivity to gain related information [14]. Transferred 
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to the context of idea selection, gain related information 
can be comprised from content-, contributor- and 
crowd-based information [30], whereas individuals with 
a promotion focus are particularly receptive to the 
positive aspects of feedback from the environment [59]. 
For example, the number of likes, which has been found 
to be an indicator for a successful implementation [7] 
might represent gain related information in the current 
context. Hence, in order to assure success and avoid 
oversights [39], raters with a promotion focus might be 
more susceptible to such positive signals of gain related 
feedback information. Since ideas with higher 
appreciations from external sources might represent 
positive signs for success, raters should show a higher 
willingness to confirm these external estimations. 
Consequently, individuals with a promotion focus 
should induce a higher tendency to follow gain related 
feedback information: H1a) Raters primed to promotion 
focus have a higher tendency to follow feedback 
information than raters primed to prevention focus. 
The broadened, riskier information processing style 
of promotion focused individuals [40] is characterized 
by a global processing of visual stimuli, while dominant 
local processing was found for individuals in prevention 
focus [15]. In this sense, promotion focus should be 
related to a lower amount of information searched, 
whereas the risk-aversion of prevention focus facilitates 
the use of substantive information in decision making 
[16]. Therefore, the extent of information searched of 
individuals with a promotion focus should be lower, 
since the eager approach [17] enforces a more holistic 
or shallower processing of information at a higher level 
of abstraction [17]. Conversely, individuals in 
prevention focus should apply a more thoroughly 
processing of information, indicated by a more 
extensive search for feedback information: H1b) Raters 
primed to promotion focus attend less feedback 
information than raters primed to prevention focus. 
Previous research associated higher task 
complexity with increased susceptibility to the 
anchoring-effect. For example, [60] showed that higher 
task complexity, induced with higher levels of cognitive 
load, created a greater anchoring-effect as individuals 
are less likely to search and use related knowledge in 
memory. Hence, participants under high cognitive load 
are more likely to treat the anchor as a cue to make 
reasonable judgments [61]. Thus, as result of high 
information load through presenting more ideas per 
subset, raters may ignore less important secondary 
attributes and focus their attention on more important 
primary attributes [62]. In this case, feedback 
information containing evaluations from previous 
decision makers (e.g. crowd) might act as mental 
shortcuts for reducing complexity. Applied to the 
context of idea selection, with more ideas presented in 
larger subsets, raters should adapt to the higher task 
complexity [48] and apply less elaborated strategies [45, 
53, 55, 63] by considering anchors as cues for 
simplification: H2a) Raters presented with more ideas 
per subset have a higher tendency to follow feedback 
information than raters presented with fewer ideas per 
subset. 
Since the required cognitive effort to make a choice 
rises with an increasing number of options [47, 64], 
decision makers ought to switch to a less effortful 
information search as a result of cognitive restrictions 
[45, 53, 55, 63]. According to adaptive decision making 
theory, when facing decision makers with high 
information load, information search becomes less 
systematic, highly selective (in terms of reducing the 
amount of information searched) and raters start 
ignoring large amounts of available information to avoid 
exceeding cognitive processing capacity [63, 65]. Given 
that more options and attributes lead to higher 
information load [63, 66], participants’ search strategy 
becomes less systematic and less exhaustive as 
attributes get ignored. Hence, presenting ideas in larger 
or smaller subsets should evoke similar effects on 
information processing behavior. In line with past 
research, showing that increasing information load will 
decrease attention on attributes [63, 66, 67], presenting 
more ideas in larger subsets should lead to a lower 
attendance on feedback information. Vice versa, a 
smaller number of ideas presented per subset enables to 
process information in a more extensive manner: H2b) 
Raters presented with more ideas per subset attend less 
feedback information than raters presented with fewer 
ideas per subset. 
4. Method  
For investigating the proposed hypotheses, this 
research utilized a laboratory experiment using eye- 
tracking methods and surveys. The data set is based on 
the extended sample of a prior experiment [25] that 
comprised an idea selection task, where participants had 
to select the most promising ideas out of a choice set of 
in total 32 ideas. The ideas were gathered from a real 
online idea competition (“OpenIDEO”) about gratitude 
at the workplace that did not require specific technical 
or domain knowledge. Since the same ideas were used 
as in the prior experiment, the set ensured a distribution 
of about 30% good ideas in order to mirror a real-world 
scenario [68]. For more details about the stratification, 
please refer to [25]. 
4.1. Treatment and experimental procedure 
The design of the experimental platform (see also 
[25]) is similar to the design of real-world innovation 
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platforms that offer information about the content of the 
ideas (idea descriptions) as well as additional feedback 
information such as the number of likes. In the 
treatments, the regulatory focus (promotion vs. 
prevention focus) as well as subset size (two vs. four 
ideas per screen) were manipulated. One group saw in 
total 16 screens with two ideas on each, whereas the 
other group saw 8 screens with four ideas on each in a 
computerized random order. The regulatory focus 
priming was applied by the procedure of [42] for 
motivating participants to either find the best ideas 
(promotion focus) or to prevent bad ideas to be declared 
as good ones (prevention focus). The procedure 
involved a combination of two traditionally priming 
techniques (for more details see [25]). The data was 
recorded by a desktop mounted Tobii Pro X3-120 eye-
tracker with a sample rate of 120 Hz and surveys. The 
stimuli were presented on a 24-inch screen with a 
resolution of 1920x1080. Each participant performed an 
automatic 5-point calibration prior to the task. Non-
overlapping Areas of Interests (AOIs) for each of the 
sub-attributes of “idea feedback information”, which 
are historical idea score (past success of the contributor), 
number of likes and creativity score (text mining score 
for creativity of idea description [35]) were defined to 
track gazes by counting fixations and ensured an error 
margin of 0.5 degree. For preprocessing the eye-
tracking data, the manufacturer’s software (Tobii Studio 
3.4.8) and built-in I-VT fixation filters with default 
parameters were used [69]. The sample contained 63 
unique data sets, which were gathered in two rounds (31 
cases from May to July 2018 and 32 cases from March 
to April 2019). The participants gained for a master 
degree at an European university and received class 
credits for participation. From the 63 data sets, in total 4 
cases had to be excluded due to measurement errors or 
inattentiveness of the participants to the task. In three 
cases, an incorrect calibration caused a shift of the entire 
eye-movement patterns. Another case was excluded due 
to insufficient processing time of the priming procedure 
(below 1 minute and therefore substantially less than the 
proposed 5 minutes) as well as the duration of the 
selection task (11.1s vs. a mean of 34.5s per idea for the 
rest of the participants). Subsequently, the final analysis 
contained 59 participants (19 females and 40 males; 
mean age = 25.17, SD = 1.895), 9 of whom had already 
contest experience and 35 of whom were working 
alongside their studies. In total 9 participants wore 
glasses, which had no negative consequences for data 
collection as cleaning cloths were provided. 
Furthermore, no participant reported any problems 
about vision in the post-experiment feedback session. 
Since the stimuli was presented in black and white, color 
blindness did not play a role. A computerized random 
number generator ensured the randomized allocation of 
the participants to one of the experimental groups. 
4.2. Measures about idea feedback information 
The idea feedback information comprised information 
from a community, about the ideator itself as well as 
from a text mining algorithm. Information coming from 
the community included the number of likes the 
community provided to each idea. In the experiment, the 
original values of the OpenIDEO-platform, ranging 
from 1 to 20 (mean of 5.84) were used. The historical 
idea scores (his) comprised information about the 
contributor and represented the original past 
appreciation of the ideator on the OpenIDEO-platform 
(e.g. sharing an idea, adding a post or an evaluation of 
others’ ideas) and ranged from 11 to 101 (mean of 
35.66). For the machine-generated idea feedback, a text-
mining algorithm [31] was applied to the idea 
description that assessed the creativity of the 
contribution within a range of -1 to 1, suggesting that 
the value for most creative ideas is close to zero. That 
machine generated creativity score span from 0.13 to 
0.36 (mean of 0.242) in the experiment. As the creativity 
score (cs) was positive for all ideas in the experiment, 
the value was recoded by inverting the score (1 minus 
original score) and ranged afterwards from 0.64 to 0.87 
(mean of 0.758) to ensure better comparability of the 
individual feedback values. Thus, all attribute values 
could be interpreted in the same direction. All three 
feedback information attributes combined represent the 
idea feedback information in the current work. 
 
4.2.1. Tendency to follow idea feedback information 
(TFIFI): The tendency to follow the idea feedback 
examines whether the magnitude of the feedback 
influenced rater’s selection. Hence, it represents the 
willingness of the raters to confirm the feedback 
information. For the operationalization, which is 
adapted from [70], the scores for each feedback 
information (number of likes, historical idea score and 
the recoded creativity score) were separately summed 
up from the selected ideas and divided by the number of 
selected ideas to consider different sizes of the selected 
idea sets. After normalizing each summed up feedback 
score by the number of selected ideas, each of the three 
attribute scores were z-transformed to account for the 
different scales. Subsequently, the means of the three z-
transformed and normalized scores were calculated to 
get an overall comprehensive number that represent the 
final tendency to follow idea feedback information. 
Thus, the higher this number, the better the indication 
that participants followed the feedback when selecting 
ideas. The following equation represents the procedure: 
 
𝑇𝐹𝐼𝐹𝐼 = 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑍 (
∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙. 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑠
# 𝑠𝑒𝑙. 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑠
) , 𝑍 (
∑ ℎ𝑖𝑠  𝑠𝑒𝑙. 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑠
# 𝑠𝑒𝑙. 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑠





4.2.2. Attendance on idea feedback information 
(AIFI). Attendance on idea feedback describes to what 
extent the idea feedback was visually attended by the 
participants. It was measured analogous to [25] as the 
number of idea feedback information fixated at least 
once divided by the total number of available idea 
feedback information presented to each participant. The 
resulting value reflects the percentage of the feedback 
that was visually attended. For example, an attendance-
value of 80% means that 80% of the feedback 
information was visually attended, whereas 20% was 
visually ignored. It was determined as follows: 
 
𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼 = (
∑ 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
) 
 
4.2.3. Other variables. Further information about 
gender, work profession as well as innovation contest 
experience was gathered with surveys to control for 
individual differences in terms of familiarity to the topic 
and the setting of idea selection tasks. 
4.3. Statistical analysis 
For investigating the effect of regulatory focus and 
subset size on the tendency to follow feedback 
information as well as the attendance to it, a two-way 
MANCOVA was performed that allows for analyzing 
group differences in terms of each dependent variable as 
well as on the dependent variables collectively [71]. 
Before starting the analysis, histograms and boxplots 
were inspected to prevent a violation of normal 
distribution of the data. Visual inspection did not reveal 
any indications for a violation, which was confirmed by 
a non-significant Kolmogorov Smirnov test (p > 0.05). 
Box M and Levene’s test ensured the assumption of 
homoskedasticity for all variables (p > 0.05) [71]. 
Hence, the analysis was pursued and hypotheses were 
tested at a significance level of 0.05. 
5. Findings 
For hypotheses testing, the two-way 2x2 
MANCOVA assessed the multivariate effect of the 
treatment variables regulatory focus and subset size on 
both dependent variables while controlling for gender, 
work experience and contest experience. The analysis 
showed that there exist a significant main effect for 
regulatory focus (Pillai’s trace = 0.118, F(2,51) = 3.405, 
p = 0.041, η² = 0.118), the subset size (Pillai’s trace = 
0.148, F(2,51) = 4.445, p = 0.017, η² = 0.148) as well as 
the interaction of both factors (Pillai’s trace = 0.111, 
F(2,51) = 3.195, p = 0.049, η² = 0.111). That 
corresponds to a medium effect size [72] for the two 
main effects and the interaction. The descriptive statistic 
is summarized in Table 1 and presents the z-transformed 
tendency to follow idea feedback and the average 
attendance on it in %. Table 2 describes the statistical 
significance of the individual measures contest 
experience, gender, work experience, regulatory focus, 
subset size as well as the interaction of both treatments. 
In order to assess the hypotheses, the ANOVA tests for 
both dependent variables were considered. 
 

























































F Sig. Effect size 
(partial eta 
 squared) 
Intercept 0.734 70.249 0.000 0.734 
Contest 
experience 
0.051 1.362 0.265 0.051 
Gender 0.026 0.682 0.510 0.026 
Work experience 0.038 1.014 0.370 0.038 
Regulatory focus 0.118 3.405 0.041 0.118 
Subset size 0.148 4.445 0.017 0.148 
Reg. focus 
x Subset size 
0.111 3.195 0.049 0.111 
 
H1a hypothesized that raters with a promotion 
focus have a higher tendency to follow feedback 
information than raters with a prevention focus. The 
analysis confirms (F(1, 52) = 1.887, p = 0.039) the 
higher willingness of promotion focused raters to follow 
the feedback information (M = 0.1689, SD = 0.7282) 
compared to raters with prevention focus (M = -0.1526, 
SD = 0.6073). Consequently, H1a is accepted. H1b 
hypothesized that promotion focus primed raters attend 
to less idea feedback information compared to 
prevention focus primed ones. The data indicated that 
participants with a promotion focus searched for less 
idea feedback (M = 0.6135, SD = 0.22944) than 
participants with a prevention focus (M = 0.6892, SD = 
0.18537). This difference was not significant (F(1, 52) 
= 3.527, p > 0.05) and subsequently rejects H1b. H2a 
hypothesized that raters presented with more ideas per 
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subset show a higher tendency to follow feedback 
information than when presented with fewer ideas per 
subset. The data revealed no statistical difference (F(1, 
52) = 0.015, p > 0.05) for that tendency between 
presenting four ideas per subset (M = -0.0076, SD = 
0.62336) compared to presenting two ideas to raters per 
subset (M = 0.0078, SD = 0.74712). Thus, H2a is 
rejected. H2b hypothesized that raters presented with 
more ideas per subset search for a smaller amount of 
feedback information than raters presented with fewer 
ideas per subset. The data supported this hypothesis 
(F(1, 52) = 8.946, p = 0.004) as raters presented with 
four ideas per subset attended to less feedback 
information (M = 0.5823, SD = 0.2088) than those 
presented with two ideas per subset (M = 0.7267, SD = 









Figure 2. Interaction for attendance feedback 
 
Next, the investigation of interaction effects 
unveiled further insights: Although there was no 
significant interaction on the dependent variable 
attendance feedback (F(1, 52) = 0.568, p > 0.05), the 
analysis revealed a significant interaction on the 
tendency to follow feedback information (F(1, 52) = 
5.255, p = 0.026). This effect indicates a higher 
willingness to follow the feedback, when participants 
were primed to prevention focus and faced with four 
ideas per subset (M = 0.0242, SD = 0.68401) compared 
to presenting two ideas per subset (M = -0.3412, SD = 
0.46378). Further, presenting two ideas to promotion 
primed participants lead to a higher tendency to follow 
feedback information (M = 0.3818, SD = 0.82429) than 
presenting four ideas (M = -0.0439, SD = 0.56947). 
Those interesting relations will be discussed in the 
following section. Figure 1 presents the z-scores of the 
tendency to follow feedback information, whereas 
Figure 2 presents the attendance on the feedback in %. 
6. Discussion and implications 
This research investigated the effects of regulatory 
focus and subset size on the anchoring effect of 
feedback information in the context of idea selection. 
The findings contribute to idea selection literature and 
have implications for practitioners as well.  
First, the results provide empirical evidence that 
raters with a promotion focus are more susceptible to 
anchoring cues since they followed feedback 
information to a higher degree than their counterparts 
with a prevention focus. This phenomenon can be 
explained by the willingness of promotion focused 
individuals to assure success and avoid oversights [39] 
as they are more likely to be triggered by positive 
(feedback) information (e.g. the number of likes) to 
avoid missing out an opportunity, even if this involves a 
higher risk of falsely declaring bad ideas as good ones. 
Thus, this research confirms as one of the first the effect 
of regulatory focus on anchoring-cues in the field of idea 
selection. Second, with respect to the extent of 
information search, the results indicate a more extensive 
search for feedback information of prevention primed 
individuals compared to the shallower information 
acquisition of promotion primed raters. Although the 
difference was not significant in the present context, the 
tendency is consistent with related literature that argues 
for substantive use of information in prevention focus in 
decision making compared to their counterparts in 
promotion focus [16]. Third, depending on the number 
of simultaneously presented ideas per subset, this 
research indicates implications for the design of choice 
architectures: Analogous to previous findings [25], 
presenting more ideas per subset lead to a decrease in 
attention on feedback information as decision makers 
have to split attention on available options due to 
cognitive restrictions. Thus, the results strengthen 
theory that advocates for a lower proportion of 
information searched when presenting more options 
[53, 54]. At the same time, however, theory is also 
extended by investigating different subset sizes while 
holding the choice set constant. In terms of anchoring, 
no significant difference was found between subset size 
and the tendency to follow feedback information. 
Hence, the hypothesized effect that raters would adjust 
their strategy to consider anchors as hints when 
confronted with higher task complexity [48, 61] was not 
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confirmed. An explanation might be that the difference 
between both subset sizes and the associated change in 
task complexity was not sufficient to push raters to their 
information processing limits. Nevertheless, 
partitioning the choice set into subsets containing a 
certain number of simultaneously presented ideas is a 
design element whose effects are interesting for further 
investigations. Finally, another interesting phenomenon 
showed the investigation of the interaction effects: 
Presenting more ideas per subset to prevention focus 
primed raters significantly increased the tendency to 
follow feedback information. Thus, the more effortful 
information processing triggered by the prevention 
focus combined with the higher task complexity 
resulting from the simultaneous presentation of four 
options potentially induced a higher burden on the 
ability to process information, which could lead to use 
feedback information as a mental shortcut. Hence, as 
recommendation for contest hosts, raters can be nudged 
to be more impartial towards anchor cues when the 
selection task is primed in prevention focus and the 
number of simultaneous presented ideas is decreased. 
However, this advantage of the prevention focus 
diminishes when more ideas are presented 
simultaneously. In contrast, promotion focus primed 
raters were more likely to follow the feedback 
information when faced with only two ideas per subset. 
An explanation of the occurring phenomenon might be 
that decision makers need reference information to infer 
the desirability of an information cue, which can come 
from innate psychological scales (e.g. for temperature), 
prior knowledge or a mode of the task that supports joint 
evaluations [73]. In the context of this research, 
reference information can either come from prior 
knowledge or joint evaluations of options as innate 
psychological scales are unlikely. Regarding prior 
knowledge, raters need experience in form of past 
knowledge in that specific task and setting, which is in 
the actual situation again unlikely. Hence, in support of 
reasoning about joint evaluations, previous research has 
found that presenting all options simultaneously (as 
compared to sequentially) facilitates the identification 
of dominant options by building reference information 
through comparisons [74]. Transferred to the actual 
context, identifying dominant options should be more 
difficult when fewer ideas per subset (two ideas) are 
presented that might increase the tendency to follow 
feedback information. Concluding, whereas individuals 
in prevention focus tend to incorporate anchors 
especially when faced with the risk of exceeding 
information-processing constraints, raters primed to 
promotion focus had a higher susceptibility to follow 
feedback information when presented with fewer ideas 
per subset. In other words, cognitively effortful 
processes emphasize anchoring-effects, whereas in 
simpler tasks anchors are used intuitively as a cue to the 
correct answer [35]. 
7. Limitations and future research 
Like any other research, this one also comes with a 
few limitations. The main effect of regulatory focus on 
attendance feedback information narrowly missed 
significance which can be addressed in future research 
on a different sample for further increasing statistical 
power. Another limitation might concern the number of 
ideas presented per subset: Due to screen size 
constraints, the maximum number of ideas that can be 
presented simultaneously without overlapping AOIs on 
feedback information had to be restricted to four 
options. Future research could explore effects of 6, 8, 10 
or more options that are simultaneously presented in 
order to investigate rater’s boundaries of information 
processing abilities and effects on susceptibility to 
anchors as well as attendance on feedback information. 
Moreover, the relationship between the tendency to 
follow feedback and the cognitive demand (cognitive 
load) might be a fruitful avenue for future investigations 
as adjustments to anchors were found to be driven by 
individual’s tendency to minimize cognitive effort [75].  
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